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Abstract 
In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' 
theorem and its variations are often used to revise 
the system's beliefs. However, if the explicit con­
ditions and the implicit conditions of probability 
assignments are properly distinguished, it follows 
that Bayes' theorem is not a generally applicable 
revision rule. Upon properly distinguishing be­
lief revision from belief updating, we see that 
Jeffrey's rule and its variations are not revision 
rules, either. Without these distinctions, the lim­
itation of the Bayesian approach is often ignored 
or underestimated. Revision, in its general form, 
cannot be done in the Bayesian approach, because 
a probability distribution function alone does not 
contain the information needed by the operation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In a reasoning system that deals with uncertainty, a propo­
sition can be represented as A[m], where A is a sentence 
of a formal language, and m indicates the sentence's uncer­
tainty. 
In different systems, A and m may have different forms and 
interpretations, and the operations on them may be defined 
differently. However, there are still operations shared by 
many systems, in spite of all the differences (Bhatnagar and 
Kana! 1986): 
Comparison: To decide which of the Ai [�]has the high­
est certainty by compru·ing � (i = 1, 2, · · · , n). 
Propagation: To get a conclusion An+! [mn+d from a set 
of premises Ai [�]. where An+! is different from 
Ai (i = 1, 2, · · · , n). 
Revision: To modify the uncertainty value of a proposition 
A from m tom' in the light of other propositions. 
Defined as above, propagation (or inference) and revision 
(or combination) are cleru·ly different. 
In propagation, the system generates a new proposition 
(with its certainty value) that was not mnong the premises. 
In revision, the system modifies the certainty value of an 
existing proposition. 
Other authors may use the two words differently (Pearl 
1988), but we can still make the above distinction, no matter 
how the operations are named. 
Bayes' theorem seems to be an exception. In some systems, 
it is used as a propagation rule, while in others, as a revision 
rule. Let's begin our analysis with these two usages, which 
will lead us to the kernel of the debate on the limitations 
of the Bayesian approach as a model of reasoning with 
uncertainty. 
2 PROPAGATION VS. REVISION 
According to probability theory, it is necessary to define a 
proposition space S in order for a system to represent and 
calculate probabilities of propositions. S is the set of all 
propositions to be processed by the system, and may be 
generated from a set of atomic propositions, using logical 
operators (Wise and Henrion 1986). 
As the starting point of all probability calculations, a prior 
probability distribution should be defined on S, under the 
constraints of the axioms of probability theory. 
To choose such a prior probability distribution for a spe­
cific problem domain, some background knowledge (such 
as statistical data or subjective estimates) and general prin­
ciples (such as the principle of indifference or maximum 
entropy) are necessary. Let's refer to them collectly as C, 
the implicit condition of the distribution function, and write 
the prior probability distribution function as 
Po: S--> [0, 1]. 
From Bayes' theorem, we can get the conditional probabil­
ity of A1 under the condition that A2 is true (obviously, the 
conditional probability is also based on C): 
(1) 
where A1 ru1d A2 are both in S (so A1 1\ A2 is in S, too), 
and P0(A2) > 0. To prevent confusion, I call A2 the 
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explicit condition of the conditional probability assignment, 
to distinguish it from C. 
Considering the three previously defined operations, we can 
see that Bayes' theorem, when used like this, is actually 
a propagation rule, not a revision rule, for the following 
reasons: 
1. The conclusion is a conditional proposition, differing 
from the premises, which are both unconditional. 
2. The rule derives a new probability assignment, instead 
of modifying a previous assignment. The prior (un­
conditional) probability assignment of A1 is still valid 
and available for future usages. 
3. It is unnecessary for the system to know whether A2 
is really true when applying the theorem. The condi­
tional probability is gotten under the assumption that 
A2 is true. If the system has enough resources, it can 
calculate all possible conditional probabilities using 
only the prior probabilities, without any "new infor­
mation" that has not been included in C. 
Used in this way, Bayes' theorem is a rule for propagating 
probability assignments from prior probabilities Pc(:z:) to 
conditional probabilities Pc(:z:Jy), not a revision rule for 
changing Pc(:z:) to a new probability distribution P0,(:z:), 
according to new evidence. 
But when we perform the previously mentioned "compari­
son" operation, usually what we are concerned with is the 
probability of propositions under all available evidence. 
For example, If we want to know which of A1 and A2 is 
more likely to be true, we'll compare Pc(Ai) and P0(A2) 
at the very beginning, when all of our knowledge about the 
problem is C. Later, if we get new evidence that shows 
A3 to be true (A3 E S), we will compru·e Pc(A1JA3) and 
Pc(A2IA3), which can be calculated according to (1). In 
such a case, to compare the "probability" of A1 and A2, 
the implicit condition C and the explicit condition A3 are 
merged together to become "all available evidence". 
Since the distinction between these two types of conditions 
no longer seems necessru·y here, it is possible to "compile" 
all of the explicit conditions that turn out to be true into the 
implicit condition of the probability distribution function, 
transforming the related conditional probabilities into new 
unconditional probabilities. This is the "conditionalization 
principle" (Earman 1992, Levi 1983, and Weirich 1983). 
To distinguish this usage from the previous one of Bayes' 
theorem, a new function BEL( :z:) cru1 be defined on S (Pearl 
1986), which representing the probability distribution under 
all available evidence: 
BEL(:z:) = P0(:z:JK) (2) 
where :z: E S, ru1d K is the current evidence. that is, the 
conjunction of all propositions in S that ru·e known to be 
true. 
Similarly, we can define a conditional distribution for 
BEL(:z:) as follows (when Pc(yJK) > 0): 
BEL(:z:Jy) 
= Pc(:z: 1\ yJK ) 
Pc(yJK) 
(3) 
Consistently with previous definitions, we refer to y as the 
probability assignment's explicit condition, and to C and K 
as its implicit condition. 
What makes BEL( :z:) different from P( :z:) is: "all evidence" 
is a dynamic concept for an open system which constantly 
accepts new knowledge from its environment, so BEL(:z:) 
is time-dependent. 
Let's use BELt ( :z:) to indicate its values at timet (here time 
is measured discretely by counting the coming evidence). 
At time 0 (the initial state), all given knowledge is inC, so 
BELo(:z:) = Pc(:z:) (4) 
Assuming at time t the current evidence is Kt. If new 
evidence shows that A is true (A E S, and Pc(AIKt) > 0), 
then, at timet+ 1, BEL(:z:) becomes 
BELt+, (:z:) Pc(:z:JKt+!) 
Pc(:z:JA 1\ Kt) 
Pc(:z: 1\ AIKt) 
Po(AIKt) 
From (2), (3) and (5), we get 
BELt+i(:z:) BELt(:z:JA) 
BELt(:z: 1\ A) 
BELt(A) 
(5) 
(6) 
Compruing (6) to (1), we can see that unlike P(:z:)'s dis­
tribution, BEL( :z: )'s distribution is modified from time to 
time by applying Bayes' theorem to transform true explicit 
conditions into the implicit condition of the distribution 
function. To BEL(:z:), Bayes' theorem is indeed a revision 
rule, not a propagation rule. 
Under the assumption that each piece of evidence is a propo­
sition represented as A[m] (according to the convention at 
the beginning of the paper), we can easily list the precondi­
tions for using Bayes' theorem as a revision rule for a prob­
ability distribution which representing the system's current 
beliefs, considering all available evidence and background 
knowledge implicitly: 
1. mE {0, 1 }, that is, the new evidence is binary-valued, 
so it can be simply written as A or -.A. 
2. A E S, otherwise its probability is undefined. 
3. Pc(A) > 0, otherwise it cannot be used as a denomi­
nator in Bayes' theorem. 
3 EXPLICIT CONDITION VS. IMPLICIT 
CONDITION 
Why do we need a revision rule in a plausible reasoning 
system? 
We are interested in the truth values of a set of proposi­
tions S, but our knowledge about them is incomplete or 
inaccurate. At the very beginning, we have some back­
ground knowledge C, which provides the prior probability 
distribution for the system. Later, when the system get new 
knowledge C', we want it to adjust its probability distri­
bution to summarize both C and C'. In such a way, the 
system can learn from its experience, and the defects in C 
are remediable. 
Of course, every information processing system has restric­
tions about the type of new knowledge that can be accepted. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that the domain knowl­
edge which can be put into the system a priori (in C), can 
also be put into it a posteriori (in C'). 
Now we can see why I distinguish implicit conditions from 
explicit conditions: for the Bayesian approach, an implicit 
condition is the knowledge that we can put into a probability 
distribution initially, and an explicit condition is the knowl­
edge that the system can learn hereafter by using Bayes' 
theorem as a revision rule. 
Therefore, our original question about whether Bayes' the­
orem can be used as a generally applicable revision rule can 
be broken down into three questions : 
1. What type of knowledge can be represented as an ex­
plicit condition? 
2. What type of knowledge can be represented as an im­
plicit condition? 
3. What is the relation between them? 
The first question is answered by the three preconditions 
given at the end of the previous section. I claim that these 
preconditions cannot be applied to implicit conditions in 
general, for the following rea•;ons: 
1. An explicit condition must be a bimu·y proposition, 
but an implicit condition cru1 include statistical con­
clusions and subjective probabilistic estimates. 
2. An explicit condition must be in S, but knowledge 
in an implicit condition only need to be related to S. 
For example, "Tweety is a bird ru1d crumot fly" can be 
part of an implicit condition, even though S includes 
only "Birds can fly", and does not include the nrune 
"Tweety" at all. 
3. If a proposition is assigned a prior probability of zero 
according to C, it crumot be used as an explicit condi­
tion to revise the function. However, in practical do­
mains, it is possible for the proposition to be assigned a 
non-zero probability according to another knowledge 
source C'. 
Now we c<m see that only certain types of implicit conditions 
can be represented as explicit conditions. It follows that if 
some knowledge isn' 1 available when the prior probability 
is determined, it is impossible to be pw into the system 
through conditionalization. 
In fact, when S is finite, a Bayesian system can only accept 
a finite amount of (different) new knowledge after irs prior 
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probability distribution is determined, if the above men­
tioned usage of Bayes' theorem is the only rule used by the 
system to process new knowledge. To see it, we only need 
to remember that the new knowledge must be inS, and each 
time a proposition A is provided to the system as a piece 
of new knowledge, at least A Md •A (as well as •A A B, 
and so on) cannot be used as new knowledge in the future. 
As a result, the number of different new knowledge that the 
system cru1 learn is less than ISI/2. 
Moreover, if we insist that all implicit conditions must sat­
isfy the three preconditions, the prior probability distribu­
tion will degenerate into a consistent assignment of 0 or 1 to 
each proposition inS, and, after the assignment, the system 
will be unable to accept any new knowledge at all. 
From a practical point of view, the restrictions set by the 
three preconditions are not trivial, since they mean that 
although the background knowledge can be probabilistic­
valued, all new knowledge must be binary-valued; no novel 
concept and proposition CM appear in new knowledge; Md 
if a proposition is given a probability 1 or 0, such a belief 
cannot be changed in the future, no matter what happens. 
We could build such a system, but unfortunately it would be 
a far cry from the everyday reasoning process of a human 
being. 
Bayes' theorem can be used as a revision rule, but with very 
strong restrictions. These limitations are so obvious and 
well-known that they seems trivial and are often ignored. 
Some people claim that the Bayesian approach is suffi­
cient for reasoning with uncertainty, and many people treat 
Bayes' theorem as a generally applicable revision rule, be­
cause explicit conditions and implicit conditions of a prob­
ability assignment are seldom clearly distinguished in the 
discussions (Cheesemru1 1985, 1986, and 1988; Pearl 1986, 
1987, ru1d 1988), where it is very common that 
1. the prior probability of proposition H is formulated as 
P(AIK), 
2. conditional probability is formulated as P(AIE, K), 
3. belief revision is described as the process by which 
P(AIB) and P(AIC) are combined to produce 
P(AIB,C). 
What does the K (and B, C) mean in these formulas? Pearl 
interpreted P(AIK) as "a person's subjective belief in A 
given a body of knowledge K" (Pearl 1987). Cheeseman 
said that conditional probability statements contain the con­
text (conditions) associated with their values, which "make 
explicit our prior knowledge" (CheesemM 1986). If K re­
ally means implicit condition, then it should not be written 
in such a form, which suggests that it is a proposition inS; if 
it meru1s explicit condition, then the revision process is not 
coJTectly described in the above formula, where P(AIB) 
and P (A I C) share the same implicit condition (so it can be 
omitted). 
Without a clear distinction between implicit conditions and 
explicit conditions, the illusion arises that all the knowledge 
supporting a probability distribution can be represented by 
expl icit conditions, and can therefore be learned by the 
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system using Bayes' theorem. As a result, the capacity of 
Bayes' theorem is overestimated. 
4 UPDATING VS. REVISION 
Now let us examine some other tools in probability theory 
that have been used for revision, to see whether we can 
avoid the three preconditions. 
After a prior probability dist1ibution Pc is assigned to a 
proposition spaceS, if some new evidence shows that "The 
probability of a proposition A (A E S) should be changed 
to m", assuming the conditional probabilities that with A or 
-.A as explicit condition are unchanged, we can update the 
probability assignment for every proposition x in S to get 
a new distribution function by using Jeffrey's rule (Kyburg 
1987 and Pearl 1988): 
Pc•(x) = Pc(xJA) x m + 
Pa(xJ-.A) x (l- m) (7) 
If we interpret "A happens" as "A's probability should be 
changed to 1 ",then Bayes' theorem, when used as a revision 
rule, becomes a special case of Jeffrey's rule, where m = 1. 
As a generalized version, Jeffrey's rule avoids the first pre­
condition of Bayes' theorem, that is, the new evidence must 
be a binary proposition. However, the other limitations are 
still applicable, that is, A E Sand Pc(A) > 0, otherwise 
Pc(:z:JA) is undefined. 
More than that, the rule is an updating rule, by which I 
mean a very special way of changing a system's beliefs. 
In an updating, when the new knowledge "the probability 
of A should be m" anives, the system's opinion on A is 
completely dominated by the new knowledge, regardless of 
Pc(A). the previous opinion about A (Dubois and Prade 
1991), and then the distribution function is modified ac­
cordingly. Such a complete updating seldom happ.ens in 
human reasoning. For revision in general, new evidence 
usually causes an adjustment, rather than an abandonment, 
of the previous opinion. 
A related method was suggested to process "uncertain evi­
dence" E[m] (m E (0, 1 )), where a "virtual proposition" V 
is introduced to represent the new knowledge a� "a (unspeci­
fied) proposition Vis true, and P(EJV) = m" (Cheeseman 
1986 and Nilsson 1986). Then a new conditional probabil­
ity distribution can be calcula,ted (after considering the new 
knowledge) for each proposition x E S in the following 
way: 
P(xJV) P(xJE A V) x P(EJV) + 
P(xJ-.E 1\ V) x P(--.EJV) 
Under the assumption that 
P(xJE 1\ V) = P(xJE) 
and 
P(xJ-.E A V) = P(xJ-.E) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
equation (8) can be simplified into 
P(xJV) = P(xJE) x m + 
P(xJ-.E) x (1-m) (11) 
If we transform the explicit condition into the implicit con­
dition by conditionalization, we end up almost with Jeffrey's 
rule. The only difference is that the prior probability is not 
updated directly, but is instead conditionalizedby a virtual 
condition (the unspecified proposition V). However, no 
matter which procedure is followed and how the process is 
interpreted, the result is the same. 
Some other systems process uncertain evidence by provid­
ing likelihood ratios of virtual propositions (Pearl 1986 an� 
Heckerman 1988), and this method also leads to condl­
tionalization of a virtual condition, therefore the rule is an 
updating rule, too. 
What I mean isn't that updating is not a valid operation in 
uncertain reasoning, but that it is different from revision. 
In certain situations, it is more proper to interpret belief 
changes as updatings (Dubois and Prade 1991 ), but revision 
seems to be a more general and important operation. When 
there are conflicts among beliefs, it is unusual that one piece 
of evidence can be completely suppressed by another piece 
of evidence, even though it make sense to assume that new 
evidence is usually "stronger" than old evidence. 
5 A DEFECT OF THE BAYESIAN 
APPROACH 
Technically, all the above discussed limitations of Ba�es' 
theorem and Jeffrey's rule are known to the uncertamty 
rea�oning community, but it is also a fact that they are of­
ten ignored or misunderstood. As a result, the limitation 
of Bayesian approach is usually underestimated. One rea­
son for this, as I claimed previously, is the confusing of 
propagation and revision, updating and revision, as ��II 
as explicit condition and implicit condition of a probability 
assignment. Once again, other authors may prefer to name 
these concepts differently, and what I want to insist is the 
necessity of making such distinctions. 
By Bayesian approach, I mean systems where 
1. cunent knowledge is represented as a (real-valued) 
probability distribution on a proposition space, and 
2. new knowledge is learned by conditionalization. 
Using previously introduced formalism, the knowledge 
base of the system at a given instant can be represented 
as Pa(x). where xES. 
I claim that the system cannot cany out the general revision 
task, that is, to learn the new knowledge A[m], which may 
conflict with the system's current beliefs. 
Actually, the conclusion directly follows from the discus­
sions in the previous sections: 
1. It crumot be done by directly using Bayes' theorem, 
since m may be in (0, 1 ), A may not be in S, and 
Pc(A) may be 0. 
2. The task cannot be fonnulated as "from P(AIC) and 
P(A IC') to get P(AIC 1\ C')", then processed by 
Bayes' theorem, since it is not always possible (or 
make sense) to represent implicit conditions as explicit 
conditions. 
3. It cannot be done by using Jeffrey's rule or its vari­
ations, since usually we don't want the system's pre­
vious opinion Pc(A) (if A E 5) to be completely 
ignored. 
If the above arguments are accepted as valid, there are some 
further questions: 
1. Do we really need a system to do revision in the general 
sense? 
2. Why it cannot be done in the Bayesian approach? 
3. How to do it in a formal reasoning system? 
For the first question, if we wrull to apply the Bayesiru1 
approach to a practical domain, one of the the following 
requirements must be satisfied: 
1. The implicit condition of the initial probability distri­
bution, that is, the domain knowledge used to deter­
mine the distribution, can be assumed to be immune 
from future modifications; or 
2. All modifications of the implicit condition can be 
treated as updating, in the sense that when new knowl­
edge conflict with old knowledge, the latter is com­
pletely abru1doned. 
From artificial intelligence's point of view, such domains 
are exceptions, rather than general situations. In most cases, 
we cannot guru·ru11ee that all knowledge the system get is un­
changeable, or later acquired knowledge is always "truer" 
than earlier acquired knowledge. More thru1 that, under 
certain conditions we even crumot guru·antee that the sys­
tem's beliefs are free from internal conflicts (Wang 1993). 
Therefore, we really hope a formal system can revise its 
knowledge in the general sense. 
For the second question, let's look at the revision operation 
as defined in the first section. For a proposition A, if from 
some evidence C1 its certainty value is eva! uated as m1, but 
from some other evidence C2 its certainty value is evaluated 
as ffi2, then what should be the system's opinion on A's 
certainty, when both cl and c2 ru·e taken into consideration? 
Obviously, the result not only depends on m1 ru1d m2, but 
also depends on the relation between C1 and C2. 
For examples, if C2 is already included in C1, then m1 is the 
final result; if C1 ru1d C2 come from different sources, m1d 
C1 consists of large amount of statistical data, but C2 only 
consists of a few exmnples, then the result will be closer to 
m1 than to m2. 
In the Bayesian approach, above mi 's become probability 
assignments, and Ci 's become implicit conditions of these 
assignments. However, in probability theory, there is no 
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way to backtrack a probability distribution's implicit con­
dition only from the distribution function itself, since it 
is possible for different implicit conditions to generate the 
same prior probability distribution. The only infonnation 
available about implicit conditions is their arrival times: 
the cun·ent distribution is "old", and the coming evidence is 
"new". In such a case, revisions have to be simplified into 
updatings. 
The Bayesian approach have no available revision rule, be­
cause its representation is not sufficiently infonnative -
little information is there about the implicit condition of the 
current probability distribution. 
It is impossible for the third question to be discussed 
throughoutly in this paper. Here I only want to make one 
claim: if the system's beliefs are still represented by a set of 
propositions, then the uncertainty of each proposition must 
be indicated by something that is more complicated than a 
single (real) number. As discussed above, the infonnation 
about Ci cannot be derived from ffii. To revise a belief, the 
belief's implicit condition must be somehow represented. 
6 AN EXAMPLE 
There are several paradigms using more than one numbers 
to represent a proposition's uncertainty, such as Dempster­
Shafer theory (Shafer 1976), probability interval (Weichsel­
berger ru1d Pohlmann 1990), and higher-order probability 
(Paa81991). I'm also working on an intelligent reasoning 
system myself, which use a pair of real numbers as a propo­
sition's "truth-value". The comparison and evaluation of 
these systems m·e beyond the scope of this paper, but I will 
use an exmnple processed by my system to show concretely 
the problem or the Bayesian approach that discussed in the 
previous sections. 
The system, "Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System" (or 
"NARS" for short), is described in a technical report (Wang 
1993) in detail. In the following, I'll briefly mention (with 
necessary simplifications) some of its properties that are 
most directly related to our current topic. 
In NARS, domain knowledge is represented as judgments, 
and each judgment has the following fonn: 
S C P <!, c> 
where S is the subject of the judgment, and P is the predi­
cate. "S c P" can be intuitively understood as "S are P", 
which is further interpreted as "P inherits S's instances and 
S inherits P's properties". "< j, c >" is the judgment's 
tntt h value, where f is the frequency of the judgment, and 
cis the confidence. 
In the simplist ca�e. the judgment's truth value can be deter­
mined like this: if the system has checked the "inheritance 
relation" between S m1d P for n times (n > 0) by looking 
at S's instru1ces, and in m times (n 2:: m 2:: 0) the checked 
instance is also in P, then f = mjn, and c = n/(n + k).1 
1 k is a parameter of the system. In the current version of the 
system, k = 2. 
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Here the meaning of f is obvious: it is the inheritance 
relation's "success frequency", according to the system's 
experience. The "confidence" c is introduced mainly for 
the purpose of revision. Given two propositions that have 
the same frequency, their confidence, that is, how difficult 
the corresponding frequency can be revised by future evi­
dence, may be quite different. When n is lru·ge, c is large, 
too, indicating that the frequency f is based on many srun­
ples, therefore will be more stable during a revision than a 
frequency that is only supported by several srunples.2 
Here is an exrunple that shows how NARS works. 
Stage 1 
The system is provided with two judgments by the user: 
J,: dove C flyer < 0.9, 0.9> 
J2: dove C bird < 1, 0.9 > 
which means the user tells the system that "About 90% 
doves are flyers", and "Doves ru·e birds". The confidence 
of the judgments are pretty high, indicating that they ru·e 
strongly supported by background knowledge of the user. 
From these judgments, the system can use its induction rule 3 to generate a conclusion 
J3 : bird C flyer < 0.9, 0.288 > 
That is, "About 90% birds are flyers", with a low confi­
dence, since the estimation of frequency is only based on 
information about doves. 
Stage 2 
The system is provided with other two judgments by the 
user: 
J4 : swan C flyer < 0.9, 0.9 > 
Js: swan C bird < 1, 0.9 > 
That is, "About 90% swru1s are flyers", and "Swans are 
birds", also with high confidence values. 
Again by induction, the system get: 
J6: bird C flyer < 0.9, 0.288 > 
J6 and h looks identical with each other, but they comes 
from different sources (NARS cru1 recognize this). 
2This is only the simplest case, but not the general method, to 
determine the truth value of a proposition. 
3NARS' induction rule: from two premises 
M c p <!I, CI > l M c s <h. C2 > 
the following conclusion can be generated 
S C P <f, c> 
where 
f = !I 
c = � hcicz+k 
Since k = 2, all inductive conclusions are hypotheses with low 
confidences (c < 1/3 ). 
Now the system can use its revision rule 4 to merge J3 and 
J6 into 
J1: bird C flyer < 0.9, 0.447> 
Here the frequency is not modified (since the two premises 
give the same estimation), but the confidence of the con­
clusion is higher, because now the frequency estimation is 
supported by more evidence (dove and swan). 
Stage 3 
The system is provided with two more judgments by the 
user: 
Js : penguin C flyer < 0, 0.9 > 
J9 : penguin C bird < 1, 0.9 > 
That is, "No penguin is a flyer", and "Penguins are birds", 
also with high confidence values. 
By induction, the system get from them 
J10 : bird C flyer < 0, 0.288 > 
Therefore, penguin provide a negative example for "Birds 
are flyers", but doesn't completely "falsify" the hypothesis, 
because the hypothesis is treated by NARS as a statisti­
cal proposition, rather than an universal generalization in 
Popper's sense (Popper 1968). 
Using J1 and ho as premises, the conclusion is further 
revised: 
J,, : bird C flyer < 0.6, 0.548 > 
The frequency of the result is lower than that of J1 (where 
only positive examples are available), but higher than J10 
(where only negative examples are available), and closer 
to h than to J10, since the former has a higher confidence 
(that is, supported by more evidence). The order that the 
two promises are acquired by the system is irrelevant -
"new knowledge" doesn't have a higher priority in revision. 
The confidence of J,1 is higher than either of the premises, 
because in revision the conclusion always summarizes the 
4NARS' revision rule: if the two premises 
sc P < !I. ci>, sc P < h. c2> 
come from different sources, the following conclusion can be 
generated: 
S C P <f, c> 
where 
f = 
c = 
"'I b +w2h w1 +wz 
Wi +tu2 w1 +w2+I ( Wi = I ��i 1 i = 1, 2) 
If the two premises come from correlative sources, the one that 
has a higher confidence is chosen as the result. This is the rule 
in NARS that corresponds to updating as discussed in previous 
sections. 
For a detailed discussion about the rules (as well as other rules 
in NARS, such as those for deduction and abduction), see the 
technical report (Wang 1993). 
premises, therefore supported by more evidence (compared 
with the premises), no matter whether the premises m·e 
consistent with each other (as when h is generated) or in 
conflict with each other (as when J11 is generated). 
Without detailed discussing about how the truth values are 
calculated in NARS, we can still get some general impres­
sions about how revisions are carried out in NARS: 
1. Revision is used to summmize information about the 
same proposition that comes from different sources. 
2. All propositions m·e revisable. 
3. When two propositions m·e summarized, the frequency 
of the result looks like a weighted sum of the frequen­
cies of the premises, with the weights determined by 
the confidence of the premises. 
4. The confidence of a revision conclusion is always 
higher than the confidence of either of the premises. 
5. Frequency and confidence m·e two independent mea­
surements, that is, it is impossible to determine one 
from the other. In the above exmnple, J6 and h have 
the same frequency but different confidence; J6 m1d 
J10 have the same confidence but different frequency. 
6. Generally, the two measurements of certainty have 
different functions in representing a system's beliefs: 
frequency is indicating the extent to which a belief is 
positive ("Yes, it is the ca�e.") or negative ("No, it is 
not the case."), and confidence is indicating the extent 
to which a belief is stable ("Yes, I'm sure.") or fragile 
("No, it is only a guess."). 
I believe that these properties are also shm·ed by actual 
human uncertain reasoning. 
In probability theory, especially in the Bayesian approach, 
the two factors (f cu1d c) m·e somehow summarized into 
a single "probability distribution". When a proposition 
is assigned a probability closing to 1, usually it mecu1s that 
almost all the background knowledge support the prediction 
that the proposition is true, <md the system already know a 
lot about the proposition. When a proposition is a�signed 
a probability closing to 0.5, however, there ru·e different 
possibilities: sometimes it means that the system knows 
little about the proposition; sometimes it means the system 
knows a lot, but the positive evidence and the negative 
evidence are almost equally strong. 
Combining these two factors into a single mem;urement 
seems fine (and sometimes even more convenient) for the 
comparison <Uld propagation operation. but it clocsn 't work 
well for the revision operation. a.:; discussed above. 
Even this conclusion is not completely new. All paradigms 
that use more thru1 one numbers to represent uncertainty 
come from the observation that "Ignorance cannot be prop­
erly represented by a real-value probability distribution". 
However, this observation is also often misinterpreted. 
To argue against the opinion that "more than one number 
is needed to represent uncertainty", Chccscrmm claimed 
(Cheeseman 1985) that a point value and a density func­
tion will give the srune result in decision making, which I 
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agree to certain extent. However, I believe he was wrong 
by saying that standard deviation Cllil be used to capture 
"the change of expectations" (or revision, as defined in this 
paper). If we test a proposition n times, m1d the results are 
the smne, then the standard deviation of the results is 0, that 
is, independent ton. But our confidence about "the result 
will remain the same" will obviously increase with n. Actu­
ally, what the standard deviation measures is the variations 
runong the srunples (which has little to do with revision), 
but what the confidence measures, intuitively speaking, is 
the amount of the samples. 
Peru·! said our confidence in the assessment of BEL(E) 
is measured by the (narrowness of the) distribution of 
BEL(Eic) as c ranges over all combinations of contin­
gencies, and each combination c is weighted by its current 
belief BEL(c) (Pearll988). I agree with him that ignorance 
is the lack of confidence, and confidence Cllil be measured 
by how much a belief assignment can be modified by pos­
sible future evidence. However, in his definition, he still 
assumes that all relevant future evidence causing a belief 
chm1ge cm1 be represented as an explicit condition, and can 
be processed through conditionalization. As a result, his 
mem;urement of confidence cannot captures the ignorance 
about implicit conditions. 
No matter whether other paradigms Cllil solve the problem, 
I claim that when the "ignorm1ce" to be represented is about 
ru1 implicit condition, it cannot be hm1dled properly by the 
Bayesian approach. For a specific domain, if revision is a 
crucial operation for the solving of the practical problems, 
the Bayesian approach cannot be used, m1d other paradigms 
should be considered. 
7 SUMMARY 
The following conclusions have been drawn: 
1. Propagation and revision are different operations in 
reasoning systems where uncertainty is represented 
ru1d processed; the former generates new beliefs (with 
truth values), and the latter modifies truth values of 
previous beliefs. 
2. The explicit condition and the implicit condition of a 
probability a�signment are different, and the latter has 
a much greater capacity for representing knowledge. 
3. When used as revision rules, Bayes' theorem merges 
explicit condition with implicit condition. Its ability 
is therefore limited. 
4. Jeffrey's rule (and its variations) is m1 upclating rule 
(replacing old knowledge by new knowledge), rather 
thcu1 a revision rule in the general sense (combining 
knowledge from different sources). 
5. In the Bayesiru1 approach, there is no way to do re­
vision, because the "frequency" factor m1d the "con­
fidence" factor in a probability distribution cm1not be 
distinguished from each other, and these two factors 
have different functions in revision. 
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6. For a system to solve the revision problem, it is not 
sufficiently informative to represent a proposition's un­
certainty by a single number. 
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